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Abstract 
The Iranian currency (rial) depreciated on average 12.2 per cent per annum against the 
U.S dollar during the period 1960-1998 but, despite continued two-digit rates of 
inflation, the rial has witnessed only a meagre 1.7 per cent fall in its value in the post 
1998 era. This paper examines this perplexing issue by identifying the major long-run 
determinants of the black market exchange rate. This paper uses the multivariate 
cointegration test, a threshold regression model and annual time series data (1960-2008) 
to determine exactly at what exchange rate the effect of relative prices on the exchange 
rate has been subject to an asymmetry adjustment process.  We found that the relative 
CPIs in Iran and the U.S., total stock of foreign debt and the price of crude oil are the 
major long-run determinants of the black market exchange rate. However, the impact of 
relative prices (as measured by the magnitude of its elasticity) has significantly 
diminished from almost unity in the pre 1998 period to less than one-fourth since 1998. 
Based on our results, if oil prices continue to plunge, liquidity and inflation are out of 
control and at the same time Iran accumulates more external debt, the exchange rate will 
eventually exhibit an unprecedented and explosive depreciation in the coming years. No 
previous study has examined this issue using a threshold regression model without 
splitting the entire sample into two sections according to an endogenously determined 
threshold for the exchange rate.  
Keywords: Iran, Black market exchange rate, Threshold regression 
 
1. Introduction 
A volatile and constantly depreciating exchange rate can adversely affect a number of key 
macroeconomic variables such as private investment, GDP growth, and the demand for 
money. In fact, the black market exchange rate and its deviation from the official exchange 
rate in Iran can be considered as a proxy measure for general public confidence in the 
performance of the economy (Valadkhani, 2003). This market forms a very important 
Iranian institution that operates in specific streets of Tehran and other large cities and in 
varied shops. One set of actors in this market may be overseas visitors, Iranians returning 
from trips abroad, Iranians now resident in other countries and visiting family and friends, 
etc. who have various quantities of a most valuable commodity, viz. other countries' 
currencies. Another set of actors comprise what can be termed "the real buyers" of these 
scarce commodities. This set includes businesspersons involved in international trade, 
particularly importers, Iranians about to travel overseas for any purposes, e.g. business 
trips, the provision of medical services, visiting relatives resident abroad, etc. 
 However, these "real buyers" will not physically undertake transactions with 
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suppliers of other currencies on the streets. This market is characterised by middlepersons 
or agents, who close the link between buyers and sellers. These agents will be typically 
unemployed or underemployed Iranians who may well be frontpersons for wealthy 
opportunistic entrepreneurs who have recognised that a government policy for the price of 
other countries' currencies is a non-market clearing price. In both the pre- and post-
revolution periods, Iran has operated a fixed exchange rate regime, albeit with periodic 
devaluations. Prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the official exchange rate between the 
rial and the US$ was approximately 70-80 rials per dollar. At that time, the gap between 
the official and the black market exchange rate was about 7-10 rials. However, the gap 
between the black market and the official rate has massively widened through time. 
 It is very interesting to note that since 1989 a new source of government revenue 
originated from the sale of foreign currencies. The exchange rate was devalued by 
approximately 25 per cent over the period 1989-1992, but in spite of such a devaluation, 
the black market for foreign currencies persisted. The government's exchange rate policy 
had the effect of making the government a beneficiary of its own policy. The gap between 
the black market and the official rates has rendered a windfall gain for both the 
government and some foreign currency dealers in the parallel market. For this reason, it is 
apparent that the substantial segment of "other revenue" in the government annual budget 
is attributable to the sale of foreign currencies by the Central Bank in the black market. 
The share of "other revenue" in the government budget increased from an average of 14 
per cent in the revolutionary and war period (1978-1988) to 36.2 per cent in the four years 
following the end of the Iraqi war (i.e. 1989-1992). It should be noted that the Central 
Bank started its direct intervention in the black market in 1988 (Valadkhani, 1997). 
 Overestimation of government revenue and/or underestimation of expenditure 
placed the Iranian government in a critical situation during the revolutionary and war 
period (1978-1988). On average the ratio of the budget deficit to total government 
expenditure trebled in this period compared to that of the oil boom period (1973-1977). In 
1989 the budget deficit was for instance so large as to represent an unprecedented rate of 
51 per cent of total expenditure. This ratio was reduced to 6.7 per cent in 1993 
(Nourbakhsh, 1993). It seems that the sale of foreign currencies by the Central Bank in the 
black market played a major role in this achievement. 
 It should also be mentioned that the black market for foreign currencies is linked 
very closely with the government's policies. In the 1980s the government experienced a 
substantial budget deficit and, as a result, government indebtedness to the Central Bank 
increased substantially. Under these circumstances soaring inflation was inevitable. This, 
in turn, amplified the gap between the official rate and the black market exchange rate for 
foreign currencies. For example, the gap between the official and black market exchange 
rates increased from an average of 175 rials per US dollar in the early 1980s to 1400 rials 
in 1989 (Valadkhani, 1997). 
 Because of this increasing gap between the official rate and the black market rate, 
the government devalued the rial to 1750 per US dollar in an attempt to restore the 
equilibrium in the foreign exchange market and foster non-oil exports. Notwithstanding the 
fact that Iran used a multiple-exchange-rate system in the allocation of scarce hard 
currency earnings, this system was not successful. According to Farzin (1995) at one time 
during the war the number of exchange rates applicable to various categories of imports 
and exports exceeded seven. 
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 The main reason for the deterioration in the value of the rial is the monetisation of 
the enormous budget deficit during and after the Iraq war. It should be mentioned that, to 
some extent, psychological and socio-political factors have also played an undeniable role. 
The growing gap between the government official and black market exchange rates 
directed scarce resources to unproductive sectors. The profitability of the trade sector, 
particularly small-scale trade such as sidewalk and small vendors, stimulated rent-seeking 
activities at the expense of goods-producing sectors. The currency devaluation policies 
also coerced economic agents, particularly the government and semi-government 
enterprises, into having an enormous demand for money (Bahmani-Oskooee, 1996). In 
other words, while the purchasing power of the rial decreases, people, including the 
government and semi-government enterprises, demand more money to cover their 
transactions. It is also argued that the income elasticity of the demand for money has 
decreased since the 1979 revolution. This means "the same rate of expansion in private 
sector liquidity is likely to have more inflationary consequences after than before the 
revolution" (Pesaran, 1995, p.5). This decline in income elasticity is also a manifestation of 
an inefficient banking system. 
 Bahmani-Oskooee (1995a, p. 278) points out that in 1993 the black market 
exchange rate was 2400 rials to the US$, involving a 30-fold depreciation of the rial. In 
March 1993 the Iranian government embarked upon the exchange rate unification policy 
with consultation of the IMF (International Monetary Fund). The major objective of this 
policy was to unify the multiple exchange rate regimes into a single equilibrium rate by the 
massive intervention of the Iranian Central Bank. However, this policy was not successful 
on various grounds, viz. the lack of an appropriate government social safety net to support 
vulnerable strata, the incorrect initial exchange rate announced by the Central Bank, and 
the unsuitable timing of the unification. See Farzin (1995) for a detailed explanation of 
these reasons and an assessment of the foreign exchange reform in Iran. 
 Therefore, in late 1995 the Iranian authorities once again decided to administer, or 
implement, the existing regulations relating to the fixed exchange rate system and "cracked 
down" on the participants in the black market. The Iranian police, with powers to arrest 
both buyers and sellers, began to be active in trying to prevent transactions in this market. 
According to Valadkhani (2004) black market exchange rate was approximately 8314 rials 
to the US$ in 2003. More recently, the Banking system buys and sells foreign currencies 
from individuals at a rate marginally below the black market rate, which is currently (April 
2009) around 9990 rials per each $US. Abstracting from political and social effects 
associated with this black market, the important question in this study is to determine the 
economic factors, which give rise to the prices in the black market for foreign currencies. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 a theoretical model is 
postulated, which captures the long-run determinants of the black market exchange rate 
using a threshold regression model. Sources of our time series data for the period 1960-
2008 as well as the summary statistics of the data and the unit-root results are discussed in 
Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical econometric results and policy implications of 
the study. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
Bahmani-Oskooee (1995a and 1995b) has made an important empirical contribution by 
applying cointegration techniques in his econometric analysis of those factors that 
determine the black market exchange rate. According to his empirical results, not only the 
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consumer price index is cointegrated with the nominal stock of money, real GDP, the 
black market exchange rate, and the world export price index (as a proxy for import 
prices), but also the black market exchange rate has a long-run relationship with the 
consumer price index, the nominal stock of money, the real GDP, and the world export 
price index. Bahmani-Oskooee's policy conclusion is that the black market exchange rate 
cannot be stabilised unless the Iranian government seriously curbs inflation.  
 Consistent with the monetary approach to the exchange-rate determination 
modelling, this conclusion is also supported by Figure 1, which shows the time series data 
on the relative consumer price indices in Iran (P) and the U.S. (P*) and the black market 
exchange rate (BE) for the US dollar in local currency during the period 1960-2008. 
According to this graph, it seems that after 1998 (the shaded area in Figure 1) the 
relationship between BE and the relative prices has been subject to a significant regime 
shift. In the post 1998 period similar to the past trend while the rate of inflation continued 
to soar significantly (15 per cent per annum on average), BE has depreciated much less 
than the anticipated figure for the period 1960-1998 (only 1.7 per cent per annum). In the 
two separate periods of 1960-1998 and 1979-1998 (referred to as the post Islamic 
Revolution era) the annual percentage changes in the consumer price index were 13.4 and 
19.4 per cent, whereas the corresponding changes for BE were 12.1 and 17.1 per cent, 
respectively.  
 One can thus conclude that while prior to 1998 there was an almost one-to-one 
relationship (to be confirmed later in this paper) between these two variables, this 
relationship mysteriously faded away in the post 1998 era. We double checked the 
accuracy of the data from Iran’ Central Bank ensuring no changes in the definition or the 
source of the data occurred through time. Since there was no inaccuracy in the data, one 
could then conclude that an “invisible hand or force” has kept the Iranian currency from 
further depreciation since 1998 and in this paper it is postulated that this dilemma could be 
attributable to the price of crude oil. As stated earlier, the sale of foreign currencies by the 
Central Bank can not only provide a major source of government revenue in its annual 
budget but also it keeps the value of rial from further depreciation. Based on Figure 1, it 
appears that relatively higher inflation no longer devalues the local currency in the post 
1998 as much as it did in the pre 1998 era. There are some empirical studies which have 
elucidated this relationship in pre 1998 period: for example see Dadkhah (1987) and 
Bahmani-Oskooee (1993). 
Figure 1. The relative CPIs in Iran (P) and the U.S (P*) and the 
Black Market Exchange Rate, 1960-2008 
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Sources: See Table I. 
 
 In his analysis of the black market exchange rate, Pesaran (1992) also emphasised 
the interaction of inflation and the rates of inflation in Iran’s major trading partners 
(measured by bilateral and multilateral real exchange rate indices). He showed that when 
Iranian prices increased more than did those of her trading partners, the black market 
exchange rate rose. Pesaran’s analysis, as does that of Bahmani-Oskooee (1995b), points 
to the crucial factor of Iran's persistent inflation as one of the determinants of the rising 
price (in Iranian rials) for major international currencies. For a concise review of the 
literature on black market exchange rates see Siddiki (2000) Bahmani-Oskooee (2005). In 
this study the long-run equation for the black market exchange rate is specified as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 lnln ln ln* ttt ttBE P/P ED PO vθα β γ+= + + +      (1) 
Where BE is the black market exchange rate (the price of $US in Iranian rial); P and P* 
denote the consumer price index (1982=1) in Iran and the U.S, respectively, ED denote 
Iran’s total external debt (in million dollar); and PO is the price of crude oil ($US per 
barrel).  
  In order to have a valid model for the black market exchange rate, there should 
be at least one cointegrating vector in the system. The Johansen (1991, 1995) 
multivariate cointegration technique is used in this paper to test the existence of a long-
run equilibrium relationship among the variables specified in equation (1). A brief 
description of this technique is presented below.  
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 Let us consider the following VAR of order q: 
 - 6 -
tq t q t1 1 2 2t t ty A y A y A y w−− −= + +⋅⋅⋅+ +        (2) 
where yt is a k-vector of I(1) variables (e.g. in this study k=4), and wt is a vector of white 
noise residuals. Following Johansen (1995), equation (2) can also be rewritten as: 
 11 1
q
t i t it iy y y tε
−
−− =
Δ =Π + Γ Δ +∑        (3) 
where , and 1
q
ii A I=Π = −∑ 1
q
i jj i A= +Γ = −∑  
The rank (r) of Π  determines the number of cointegrating vectors. If  has a 
reduced rank (i.e. r<k), then there exist 
Π
k r× matrices α  and β each with rank r, where 
αβ ′Π =  and tyβ ′ is stationary. The elements of α  represent the adjustment parameters 
and each column of β in the literature is referred to as the cointegrating vector. Thus the 
important issue is how to determine the number cointegrating vectors (or r). In this 
paper the trace statistics will determine r. The trace statistics test the null hypothesis of r 
cointegrating relations against the alternative of k cointegrating equations. For more 
details see Johansen (1991, 1995).  
Let us assume that: a) all the variables in equation (1) are I(1); b) the resulting 
residuals are I(0); and c) there is only one cointegrating vector in the system. Hence, 
against the background of the preceding discussion, the following threshold regression 
for the black market exchange rate can be used to capture the asymmetric impacts of the 
relative prices on BE: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 0 * *ln ln ln ln ln/ / ttt tt tBE EP P P Pα α θ θ β γ− +
− +
− +⎡ ⎤+ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
= + + ++ D PO v+  (4)  
It should be noted in equation (4) depending on whether the black market 
exchange rate is below or above a certain threshold value ( )τ , the expected positive 
long-run effects of relative prices on the dependent variable will then be  and θ θ− + .   
Also BE is also allowed to be subject to a shift in its intercept term: α −  for the time 
period when tBE τ<  and α +  for the time period, when tBE τ≥ . Based on the actual 
data presented in Figure 1, one expects that > θ θ− +  but the sign and relative 
magnitudes of the two intercept terms are subject to our empirical investigation. The 
asymmetric definitions of the relative prices can be briefly stated as follows: 
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )
( )
* *
* *
*
/ /  if 
/ / ,0 and
/ 0 if 
tt t
t t
tt
P P P P BE
P P min P P
P P BE
 
τ
τ
−
− −
−
⎧ = <
⎪⎪= ⇒ ⎨
⎪
= ≥⎪⎩
   (5)  
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( ) ( )
( )
* *
* *
*
/ /  if 
/ / ,0 and
/ 0 if 
tt t
t t
tt
P P P P BE
P P max P P
P P BE
τ
τ
+
+ +
+
⎧ = ≥
⎪⎪= ⇒ ⎨
⎪
= <⎪⎩
   (6) 
 It is important to note that this specification assumes that the impact of the nominal 
stock of money, as proposed by Bahmani-Oskooee (1995b), is captured by the consumer 
price index. It is expected that the Iranian currency can appreciate (BE declines in 
magnitude) as prices in Iran increase less than prices in the U.S, as external debt declines, 
and as the price of oil rises. Petrodollars provide more market power to Iran’s central bank 
to set their desired benchmark price for foreign currencies in the market. Therefore, it can 
be hypothesised that if the price of oil is plunging and if the stock of external debt is on the 
rise and price rises in Iran are higher than those in the U.S economy, particularly when 
BE τ< , then the price of dollar in local currency would rise. Based on these theoretical 
postulations, it is then expected that 0β > , > 0θ θ− + >   and 0γ < .  
It should be noted that when the null of θ θ− += cannot be rejected, the relative 
prices no longer exert asymmetric effect on BE before or after an optimum threshold 
value or τ  and this can be empirically verified by conducting a standard F-test. Given 
that the value of the threshold is unknown, its value should be empirically determined 
despite the fact that based on Figure 1 it is suspected that such a threshold must have 
occurred around 1998-1999. Having said that, we need to determine an accurate and 
optimum value for this threshold endogenously using a formal model. A consistent 
value of the threshold can be found by undertaking a grid search by first sorting the BEt 
sequence in an ascending order as proposed by Enders and Siklos (2001). According to 
Tong (1990, p.99), this type of threshold regression model ‘allows the analysis of a 
complex stochastic system by decomposing it into a set of smaller sub-systems’ without 
the need for splitting the sample period, which creates a problem regarding the lack of 
degree of freedom in each side of our sample. 
To have enough observations in each side, BEt is first sorted in ascending order, 
and based on the middle 60 per cent of the observations, the minimum ($85 for BE) and 
maximum ($8008) gird search values are determined. Within 7923 trials (=8008-85) in 
our grid search for the best threshold value, the minimum value of grid will be 
incremented each time by $1 sequentially till the maximum value is reached. Ceteris 
paribus, any value of the threshold which yields the lowest residual sum of squares in 
equation (4) will be considered as a consistent estimate of the threshold. It is not 
counterintuitive to assume that all of the explanatory variables to be at least weakly 
exogenous as their values are highly likely to be determined outside of our model. 
Given the results of Johansen multivariate cointegration test and our Hausman test 
results (not reported in this paper due to the page limit), we found no simultaneity 
problem in equation (4), whereby justifying the use of OLS estimation method.  
 
3. The Data 
Before estimating our model and report our empirical results, it is important to look at the 
sources and definitions of the data employed in Table I. Annual time series data cover 
the period 1960 to 2008 for all variables indicated in equation (1). Over this period, 
Iran’s CPI, the relative price index and the black market exchange rate were the most 
volatile series based on the magnitude of their coefficients of variation (CV). The 
reported skewness, Kurtosis and Jarque-Bera statistics in Table I indicate that with the 
exception of the CPI of the US none of the variables are normally distributed. The plots 
of the data have been presented in Figure 2. As can be seen, Iran’s external debt prior to 
the 1979 Islamic Revolution was basically zero. In order to take the natural logarithm of 
this variable, those years with value of zero debt were assumed to be equal 0.00001.  
An important step before using the Johansen multivariate technique is to 
determine the time series properties of the data. This is an important issue since the use 
of non-stationary data in the absence of cointegration can result in spurious regression 
results. To this end, the Kwiatskowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS, 1992) test has 
been adopted to examine the stationarity, or otherwise, of the time series data. The 
KPSS test has the null of stationarity, and the alternative indicates the existence of a 
unit root. The empirical results of the KPSS test are also summarised in Table I, 
suggesting that all the variables employed in this analysis are I(1).  
 
Table I. Summary statistics of the data employed, 1960-2008 
Description ( )tBE  ( )tP  *( )tP  ( )*/ tP P  ( )tED  ( )tPO  
Sources (a) (a) (b) (a) and (b) (a) (c) 
Unit Rials per each $US 
Index 
number 
(1982=1) 
Index 
number 
(1982=1) 
Relative price 
index 
(1982=1) 
Million 
$US 
West Texas 
Intermediate 
$US per 
barrel 
Mean 2550 13.16 1.08 7.13 7766 21.3 
Maximum 9489 98.00 2.23 43.93 28647 99.6 
Minimum 74 0.17 0.31 0.49 0 2.9 
Std. Dev. 3438 22.84 0.62 10.84 8741 19.7 
CV 135 174 58 152 113 93 
Skewness 1.09 2.04 0.21 1.75 0.88 1.88 
Kurtosis 2.46 6.52 1.66 5.16 2.49 7.35 
Jarque-Bera 10.22 59.22 4.03 34.56 6.81 67.43 
P-value 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.03 0.00 
Variable ( )ln tBE  ln( )tP  *ln( )tP  ( )*ln / tP P  ( )ln tED  ( )ln tPO  
KPSS test 1.485♣ 0.618♣ 1.023♣ 0.466♣ 0.464♣ 0.758♣ 
Variable ( )ln tBEΔ  ln( )tPΔ  *ln( )tPΔ  ( )*ln / tP PΔ  ( )ln tEDΔ  ( )ln tPOΔ  
KPSS test 0.265 0.406 0.150 0.442 0.092 0.114 
Notes: 
(1) According to Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS, 1992, Table 1), the 5% asymptotic critical 
value for the KPSS test is 0.463. (2) ♣ indicates that the KPSS null hypothesis (the series being stationary) 
is rejected at the 5 per cent significance level.  
 
Sources:  
(a) Tabibian et al. (2000), the Central Bank (2009). 
(b) Bureau of Labor Statistics, Washington, D.C.: ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt 
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(c) Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis:  
      http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/OILPRICE/downloaddata/OILPRICE.xls 
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Figure 2. Plot of the data employed 1960-2008 
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Source: See Table I. 
4. Empirical Results and Policy Implications 
 the Johansen (1991, 1995) multivariate 
able II. Johansen test for cointegration 
statistic 
% critical 
Since all the variables in equation (1) are I(1),
cointegration technique can now be used to test the existence of a long-run equilibrium 
relationship for BE. The first important step in this test is to determine the optimal lag 
length (q). Based on the Schwarz information criterion and the Hannan-Quinn information 
criterion, the optimal lag length is equal to one. Table II reports the results of the Johansen 
multivariate cointegration test on the black market exchange rate as formulated in equation 
(1). According to the trace test, there is robust evidence of one cointegrating vector at the 
5 per cent level of significance.  
 
 
T
Hypothesized Eigenvalue Trace 5No. of CE(s) value 
None 0.42 66.64* 63.88 
At most 1 0.38 41.25 42.92 
At most 2 0.24 18.41 25.87 
At most 3 0.11 5.68 12.52 
N at th espondi ypothote: * indicates th e corr ng null h esis 
is rejected at 5 % significance level. 
 
Table III. Long-run threshold regression results 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 0 * *ln ln ln ln ln/ / ttt tt tBE ED PO vP P P Pα α θ θ β γ− +
− +− ++ ⎡ ⎤= + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
+ +  
Parameters Estimated elasticities t-statistics
* p-value 
0α−  5.9262 39.2 0.00 
0α+  8.1039 44.5 0.00 
θ −  0.9672 16.6 0.00 
θ +  0.2291 2.6 0.01 
β  0.0633 6.3 0.00 
γ  -0.1024 -1.8 0.08 
Order of integration of stochastic residuals: I(0) 
Goodness-of-fit statistics: 
R2=0.995              Overall F statistic F =1392 
Hypothesis testing using Wald F test: 
    Asymmetric intercept effect 10 0 0:H α α− = + : F(1, 42)=52.42 [p-value=0.00] 
    Asymmetric Slope effect 20 :H θθ +− = : F(1, 42)=35.64 [p-value=0.00] 
    Slope Coefficient hypothesis: 
         Before 1998 30 :H 1θ − = : F(1, 42)=0.318 [p-value=0.58] 
         After 1998   40 : 0.2H 5θ + = : F(1, 42)=0.060 [p-value=0.81] 
Diagnostic tests: 
DW 2.23  
Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation LM Test (AR 1-2): F(2,40)=0.382 [0.68]
♣ 
Normality χ2 (2)  = 2.33 [0.53]♣ 
White Heteroskedasticity F (16, 31) = 3.30♣♣ [0.01]♣ 
RESET F (2, 40) =2.30 [0.11]♣ 
Chow Forecast Test: Forecast 
from 2004 to 2008 F (5, 37) =0.12 [0.98]
♣ 
Notes: (♣) Figures in square brackets show the corresponding p-values; (♣♣ ) Due to an 
unknown form of hetroskedasticity in the residuals we used the Newey-West HAC 
standard errors and covariance matrix to correct the standard errors and t-ratios.  
 
 
 There are 49 annual observations in the sample period (1960-2008). We have 
estimated the threshold regression model as specified in equation 4 and presented the 
results in Table III. Our grid search points to an optimal value of 6468τ = , which has 
been endogenously determined by the data. This optimal threshold value for the black 
market exchange rate occurs exactly in the year 1998 when the relationship between 
P/P* and BE was initially suspected to break down according to Figure 1. As seen from 
Table III, all of the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at least at the 8 per 
cent level or better, and have the expected theoretical signs. This equation also performs 
extremely well in terms of goodness-of-fit statistics. The adjusted R2 is as high as 0.995 
and the overall F test rejects the null hypothesis at the one per cent level. With the 
except of the White test, this equation also passes each and every diagnostic tests and as 
a result we have used the Newey-West HAC standard errors and covariance matrix to 
correct the standard errors and t-ratios. The threshold regression model presented in 
Table III also performs extremely well in terms of out-of-sample forecasting ability for 
the five years period of 2004 to 2008. 
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 Based on the Wald test results in Table III, we cannot reject both 
3
0 : 1H θ − = and 40 : 0.2H 5θ + = . Thus one can briefly write our estimated threshold 
regression model as: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
*
*
5.93 1.0 ln /  if 6468
ln 0.06 ln 0.10 ln and  
8.10 0.25ln /  if 6468
tt
tt t t
tt
P P BE
BE ED PO v
P P BE
−
+
+ <
= − + +
+ ≥
⎧
⎪⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪⎩
  (7) 
 Therefore, one can argue that in the long-term, one per cent increase in relative 
prices (P/P*) could result in almost one per cent depreciation of the Iranian currency in 
the pre 1998 period, when . But this same percentage increase in (P/P*) has 
led to only 0.25 per cent depreciation of the currency since 1998. In terms of the 
magnitude of the estimated elasticity for ED, the results indicate that if external debt 
increases say by 10 per cent BE will depreciate by 0.06 per cent. It is also found that an 
increase in the price of crude oil by 10 per cent, ceteris paribus, could strengthen the 
value of Iranian rial in the long-run by 1 per cent. In other words, the results reported in 
Table III indicate that the long-term sources of the continuous depreciation of the 
Iranian rial are high inflation rates, a massive rise in the stock of foreign debt through 
time and a fall in the price of oil. 
6468tBE <
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper the long-term drivers of the black market exchange rate in Iran have been 
examined by using annual time series data from 1960 to 2008. The Johansen 
multivariate cointegration technique was employed to estimate and validate a long-term 
exchange rate model. The empirical results are broadly consistent with previous studies 
and the monetary approach to the exchange-rate determination. It is found that in the 
long-term a reduction in the stock of external debt, a rise in the price of crude oil 
accompanied by strict monetary and fiscal policies aimed at curbing the rate of 
inflation can restore and strengthen the value of the Iranian currency. In terms of the 
magnitude of the estimated elasticities, it seems that the coefficient for the relative 
prices has diminished from unity during the period 1960-1998 to almost 0.25 since 
1998.  
Based on our results there is a statistical significant cointegrating vector 
capturing the long-run determinants of the black market exchange rate in Iran (as 
defined by equation 1). Hence, one expects that eventually the one-to-one relationship 
between the relative prices and the exchange rate would prevail and this may lead to a 
further and faster depreciation of the black market exchange rate in Iran. In sum, if the 
Iranian government is to continue financing its large budget deficits through 
monetisation, sooner or later inflation can depreciate the domestic currency on a one-
to-one basis. Therefore, curbing inflation should be the number one priority on the 
policy agenda of the government and this cannot be achieved unless the central bank of 
Iran operates independently and stop the monitisation of the government’s massive 
fiscal deficits. 
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